Review for Unit Three

J. L. Austin (1911-1960)
from How to Do Things With Words (1962)

constative
performative
speech act

“Utterances can be found, satisfying these conditions, yet such that
A. the do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true or false’; and
B. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again
would not normally be described as, or as ‘just,’ saying something” (5).

felicitous/infelicitous
misfire
misinvocation
misapplication
misexecution
flaw
hitch

abuse
insincerity

locutionary (saying)
illocutionary (in saying x I do y)
perlocutionary (by saying x I do y)

(how can these categories overlap in a single utterance?)

“Thus we distinguished the locutionary act. . . which has a meaning; the illocutionary act which
has a certain force in saying something; the perlocutionary act which is the achieving of certain
effects by saying something” (121).

“It is characteristic of perlocutionary acts that the response achieved, or the sequel, can be
achieved additionally or entirely by non-locutionary means: thus intimidation may be achieved
by waving a stick or pointed a gun” (119).

Louis Althusser (1918-1990)
from “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970)

ideology

“Thesis I: Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of
existence” (162).

“Thesis II: Ideology has a material existence” (165).

“. . . an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is mate-
rial” (166).

ideological state apparatus
repressive state apparatus

“Throughout this schema we observe that the ideological representation of ideology is itself forced
to recognize that every ‘subject’ endowed with a ‘consciousness’ and believing in the ‘ideas’ that
his ‘consciousness’ inspires in him and freely accepts, must ‘act according to his ideas,’ must therefore inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his material practice” (167-168).

material
idea
action
spontaneity
obviousness

subject/subjectivity

“Like all obviousnesses, including those that make a word ‘name a thing’ or ‘have a meaning’ (therefore including the obviousness of the ‘transparency’ of language), the ‘obviousness’ that you and I are subjects—and that that does not cause any problems—is an ideological effect, the elementary ideological effect” (171-172).

recognition
misrecognition

interpellation “... all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject” (173).

freedom
subjection

Judith Butler (1956- )


ritual
repetition
iterability

“The ‘moment’ in ritual is a condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that constitute and escape the instance of utterance” (3).

hate speech

“Language sustains the body not by bringing it into being or feeding it in a literal way; rather, it is by being interpellated within the terms of language that a certain social existence of the body first becomes possible” (5).

“violence of representation” (Toni Morrison)

agency
chiasmus

“The act of threat and the threatened act are, of course, distinct, but they are related as a chiasmus” (11).

“To bridge the Austinian and Althusserian views, one would need to offer an account of how the subject constituted through the address of the Other becomes a subject capable of addressing others. In such a case, the subject is neither a sovereign agent with a purely instrumental relation to language, nor a mere effect whose agency is pure complicity with prior operations of power. The vulnerability to the Other constituted by that prior address is never overcome in the assumption of agency (one reason that ‘agency’ is not the same as ‘mastery’)” (25-26).